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Abstract
Australia’s welfare-to-work system has been subject to ongoing political contestation and
policy reform since the s. In this paper we take a big picture look at the Australian system
over time, re-visiting our earlier analysis of the impact of marketisation on flexibility at the
frontline over the first ten years of the Australian market in employment services. That analysis
demonstrated that marketisation had failed to deliver the service flexibility intended through
contracting-out, and had instead produced market herding around a common set of stand-
ardised frontline practices. In the interim, there have been two further major redesigns of
the Australian system at considerable expense to taxpayers. Re-introducing greater flexibility
and service tailoring into the market has been a key aim of these reforms. Calling on evidence
from an original, longitudinal survey of frontline employment service staff run in , 
and , this paper considers how the Australian market has evolved over its second decade.
We find remarkable consistency over time and, indeed, evidence of deepening organisational
convergence. We conclude that, once in motion, isomorphic pressures towards standardisation
quickly get locked into quasi-market regimes; at least when these pressures occur in low-trust
contracting environments.
Keywords: quasi-markets; isomorphism; contracting-out; marketisation; welfare-to-
work; tailoring
Introduction
Since the s, there has been a radical change in the institutions delivering
public employment services in many OECD countries. Nowhere has this been
more apparent than in Australia which, in ten years, went from a publicly
delivered employment services regime, to a system of shared delivery between
the public and private sectors, to an entirely privatised system of market
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delivery. These institutional changes have involved a fundamental shift in the
role of the government from a provider to a purchaser of services, driven
by a set of principal-agent assumptions about the ability of contracts to
mitigate information asymmetry problems in public service supply chains,
and the conviction that marketisation can produce a system that is not only
more efficient but also ‘more tailored, more personalised, and more flexible’
(Considine et al., : ). This was the underlying logic behind the intro-
duction of Australia’s Job Network (JN), an ‘internationally important social
policy experiment’ (Ramia and Carney, : ) in competitive tendering
that operated from  until .
Successive Australian governments have shown no loss of appetite for
continued service market experimentation. Along with periodic contracting
rounds, there have been two major system re-structures: Job Services
Australia () and Jobactive (), each designed to address identified
shortcomings of their predecessors. Frequently these related to the inability
of successive market models to produce services that were flexibly tailored
to the long-term unemployed; criticisms frequently levelled against JN
(Bredgaard and Larsen, ; Finn, ; McDonald and Marston, ;
Ramia and Carney, ). In a study drawing on comparative survey research
with frontline employment services staff in the late s and , Considine
et al. () concluded that JN had evolved into a highly standardised system, as
providers adopted increasingly conservative and converging practices over time.
In this paper, we examine this second decade of Australian quasi-market
reform and the changes that have unfolded since JN. Drawing on two further
waves of data collection from frontline staff in  and  and comparing
these to the earlier study of frontline service delivery under JN, we consider
whether more recent restructures have been able to arrest the previously docu-
mented trends towards service standardisation and provider herding that
appeared to have set in by the end of JN. Or have such features become indelibly
‘locked-in’ to the Australian welfare market?
In developing this analysis, we draw on the concept of institutional isomor-
phism from organisational theory (DiMaggio and Powell, ; Beckert, ),
as well as insights from quasi-markets and transaction cost theory concerning
the effects of different transaction modes on competition and quality (for exam-
ple Greer et al., ; Bennett, ; Bartlett, ), to examine the dynamics of
change within employment services fields and the extent to which such public
services markets can be expected to evolve into more varied systems or consoli-
date around a set of ‘dominant organisational models’ (DiMaggio and Powell,
: ). Theorists predict that public service organisations are particularly
susceptible to isomorphism, or convergence towards similar organisational
structures and processes, due to their resource dependency and accountability
relationships to government (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, ); features that,
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we argue, apply equally to non-government organisations in publicly-funded
welfare markets. Indeed, aspects of how the transactional arrangements
between purchasers and providers are organised in welfare markets can further
strengthen and intersect with these isomorphic pressures to reinforce tendencies
towards standardisation in employment services fields. These include the struc-
ture of the pricing mechanism, the level of prescription in contracts, the high
barriers to entry facing new entrants and uncertainty over the relationship
between provider inputs and client outcomes; conditions that incentivise
organisations to replicate what others already do – but to try to do so more
efficiently – while shielding established providers from new competitors with
alternative organisational processes.
In what follows, we introduce the concept of institutional isomorphism
and how it relates to understanding patterns of development and change within
public services markets. We then review the key design features and evolution
of Australia’s JN, and subsequent attempts to reform Australia’s marketised
system towards greater flexibility, before introducing the present study
and our findings.
Isomorphism in organisational fields
New theories of public management posit that the creation of quasi-markets will
enhance diversity in service delivery as agencies strive to innovate to gain com-
petitive adavantage. They view the competitive drive for efficiency as the catalyst
of institutional change, as in the example of Payment-by-Results contracts
which rely on the performance signals in payment models to motivate agencies
to ‘develop new practices to identify and tackle individual employment barriers’
(Finn, : ). For organisational theorists in sociology, however, it is the
demand for legitimacy rather than efficiency that is ‘the major driving force
of organisational change’ (Knill and Balint, : ), and which drives
organisations within shared fields of action to become ‘more similar without
necessarily making them more efficient’ (DiMaggio and Powell, : ).
Over time, organisations exposed to similar conditions converge on ‘similar
norms, structures and systems’ (Kitchener, : ) as they adapt ‘to conform
to the expectations of the key stakeholders in their environment’ (Ashworth
et al., : ).
DiMaggio and Powell () identify distinct coercive, mimetic, and
normative isomorphic mechanisms. For example, organisations may adapt
because they are pushed into doing so by organisations they depend upon, such
as governments. Governments can coerce organisations to adjust their struc-
tures through their ‘power to regulate’ (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, :
) but also through their control over funding (Ashworth et al., ). In such
cases of coercive isomorphism, diffusion occurs through defensive reactions to
-   - :       ? 
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279419000941
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.45.5.179, on 27 Apr 2020 at 14:38:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
systems of administrative accountability, as organisations comply with institu-
tional pressures to adopt ‘those routines and structures that are defined by law or
government agencies as legitimate’ (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, : ).
Eligibility requirements for government contracts, for example, may push
organisations within a given field to adopt similar financial reporting and
governance processes. Kitchener’s () study of quasi-market transformation
among UK hospitals showed how representative bodies informally exerted
pressures on hospital managers to adopt a clinical directorates organisational
structure, which then became the archetypal UK hospital model despite never
being mandated as policy. In the context of the Australian welfare market,
previous studies have highlighted the pressures exerted on not-for-profits to
professionalise and reform their boards in order to maintain exchange relation-
ships with government (Considine et al., b).
In public services markets characterised by a purchaser-provider split,
governments may also exert coercive isomorphic pressures on organisations
through how they structure the transactions within those markets (Greer
et al., ). For example, the purchaser may specify fixed processes, such as
the frequency of appointments or minimum requirements in clients’ activity
agreements, that providers must adhere to in order to receive payment.
Alternatively, the purchaser may leave it to providers to determine what services
clients receive, and when, but arrange the payment model so that providers are
predominantly paid based on specified outcomes. However, strengthening the
performance signals in payment models may generate standardising tendencies
of their own by intensifying providers’ aversion to risk. This is because they
transfer the costs of under-performance onto providers, making experimenta-
tion with unproven approaches riskier for organisations.
Importantly, coercive isomorphic pressures are predicted to intensify the
more organisations are dependent on another organisation. Greater inter-
dependence generates greater similarity ‘in structure, climate, and behavioural
focus’ (DiMaggio and Powell, : ). Again, the modes of transaction in
welfare markets, and how they are organised by the purchaser, are likely to have
important implications for the degree of organisational inter-dependence in
employment services fields. In quasi-markets where users are ‘empowered’ to
purchase services directly through the grant of vouchers, organisations are less
financially dependent on the purchasing power of governments than in quasi-
markets where governments procure services and ‘simply direct the user to the
provision it has bought’ (Wiggan, : ). In practice, employment services
markets are rarely organised around user-choice. Rather, as in the Australian
market, governments often act as the sole purchaser. This would suggest that
providers in Australia may be particularly vulnerable to coercive isomorphic
pressures because they are competing in a field in which the flow of resources
is controlled by a ‘monopsony’ purchaser. Established providers that have
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organised their businesses around delivering contracts may be especially vulner-
able to coercive isomorphic pressures if they have become ‘“tied into” the field’
(Taylor et al., : ) through resource dependency.
While regulatory and government funding arrangements are ‘core drivers’
(Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, : ) of isomorphism, organisations can also
be pulled towards convergence by normative and mimetic processes. Normative
isomorphic forces result from processes of professionalisation, which DiMaggio
and Powell identify in terms of the rise of professional communities and indus-
try associations that serve ‘to promulgate normative rules about organisational
and professional behaviour’ (: ). These ‘epistemic communities’ (Knill
and Balint, : ) help to diffuse common understandings of policy prob-
lems and their solutions within fields. In mimetic isomorphism, organisations
model themselves on counterparts that are perceived to be more legitimate
or more successful, or they import practices by osmosis through employee trans-
fer. DiMaggio and Powell () predict that mimetic isomorphism will be more
prevalent in fields where there is uncertainty over the relationship between
means and ends; an inherent feature of the ‘complex and multi-dimensional’
transactions that occur in welfare markets insofar as they involve ‘the provision
of sophisticated service activities rather than the relatively basic provision of
material commodities with which traditional markets deal’ (Bartlett, : ).
Organisations delivering social services do so under conditions of bounded
rationality. The causal effects of particular service inputs on client outcomes
are not particularly well understood. Amidst these conditions, the mimetic
copying of established processes reduces ‘the decision load’ (Beckert, :
) of determining which configuration of practices is likely to fulfil objectives.
Organisations strive to ensure their legitimacy by emulation. Not because of any
clear evidence that the copied practices will optimise performance but because
some options appear to have an established legitimacy (Ashworth et al., ).
For organisations entering the field, emulation may be a way of more easily
fitting the ‘administrative categories that define eligibility for public and private
grants and contracts’ (DiMaggio and Powell, : ). In this context, the
grant of government contracts may structure isomorphic processes by giving
key firms recognition and legitimacy, motivating competitors ‘to copy aspects
of their structure or operating procedures in the hope of obtaining similar
rewards’ (DiMaggio and Powell, : ).
Institutional change at the Australian frontline
Australia was one of the first OECD countries to fully competitively tender its public
employment services, which it did under JobNetwork inMay . It was described
by the Australian government as ‘the most significant reorganisation of labour
market assistance arrangements’ (quoted in O’Flynn, : ) since the s
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and, by the OECD, as ‘without parallel’ internationally (Finn, : ). According
to O’Flynn, ‘it was clear that a new era in employment services
had begun’ (: ). Although Struyven () argues that the transformation
of Australia’s system in fact unfolded through a more gradual process of institutional
layering, displacement and conversion. Indeed, prior to JN, several
hundred for-profit and non-profit agencies were licensed to deliver case
management to the long-term unemployed under Labor’s Working Nation
(). This reform created a dual system in which the Commonwealth
Employment Service continued to deliver services to a proportion of jobseekers,
while a new market was created for case management of the long-term unemployed.
In this way, market-based administrative principles were ‘layered’ onto the existing
public system setting in motion new institutional logics that would eventually dis-
place the public foundations of the system under the Howard Coalition government.
Under the first JN contract, a mix of over  private, community and
government-owned providers won contracts to deliver a range of job-matching,
job-search training, and intensive assistance services with the non-public
providers winning two-thirds of the market (O’Flynn, ). Agencies received
a combination of service fees and outcome payments that varied depending on
the duration that clients were placed into employment or training and which
were differentiated according to jobseekers’ assessed level of disadvantage.
The second JN contract (–) extended price competition to intensive
service provision, and private providers won almost  per cent of contracts
as the new market competition logic became the system’s ‘major driving force’
(Ramia and Carney, : ).
The first two JN contracts operated mostly as ‘black box’ systems in that
providers were afforded much leeway to determine the assistance they provided.
However, this changed from , when greater specification concerning the
content and frequency of services was introduced along with minimum service
guarantees. While partly about guaranteeing service quality, this measure was
also designed to ensure that jobseekers’ mutual obligations were consistently
enforced under a new Active Participation model (Considine et al., : ).
Providers were required to document how clients were meeting their condition-
ality requirements via a new central IT platform. This information could
be viewed by agency managers and departmental officials, who exhibited an
increased inclination towards recovering payments from providers who were
found to have misused their discretion. This heavier regulation was driven by
growing evidence that agencies were gaming the system through practices of
‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ clients (Considine, ), and even ‘creating phantom
jobs’ to collect payments (O’Flynn, : ).
Another important change was the abandonment of price-competition
during tenders. In the face of evidence that agencies’ contract bids were ‘at a
level that was insufficient to ensure proper employment assistance for the most
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disadvantaged’ (Thomas, : ), the government instituted fixed prices and a
quarantined pool of funds (the Employment Fund) for purchasing assistance for
clients that providers were unable to retain as profit. With price-competition
abandoned, past performance became the basis for allocating contracts and
market share as determined by a new ‘Star Ratings’ performance measurement
system. This system, which was introduced in  and remains in operation,
uses a confidential regression to award each site a performance rating – initially
every six months, but now quarterly – that then feeds into providers’ overall
rating at a region level. It was originally intended as a kind of ‘Michelin
Guide’ (Considine et al., : ) for signalling providers’ relative performance
to clients, although it quickly became the key mechanism for awarding contracts
and periodically (re)allocating shares of jobseekers within contract regions from
low to high-performing providers. Sixty per cent of the agencies awarded
contracts in  automatically had their contracts extended based on their
Star Ratings. It was at this point in the system’s evolution that the govern-
ment-owned provider collapsed, seemingly unable to compete with the other
private agencies that made up the rest of JN. In , less than  per cent
of contracts were competitvely tendered as JN became consolidated around
one hundred ‘core providers’ (Finn, ), all for-profits or not-for-profits.
The marketisation of Australia’s employment services was driven by the
belief that competition would not only increase efficiency but also promote
innovation and tailoring. While the average cost of employment outcomes
did decline (Thomas, ), JN did not produce the levels of flexibility pre-
dicted. Studies suggest that it instead resulted in a quasi-market of agencies
focused on survival, and for whom the risk involved in not sticking to beaten
paths was ‘simply too high’ (Bredgaard and Larsen, : ). Part of the prob-
lem related to the purchaser’s increasingly prescriptive approach to regulating
transactions within the market. Increasing contractual specification and the
detailed oversight of providers via the application of IT-based information
systems, critics contended, had given rise to an ‘inflexible’ pattern of outsourced
services’ (Finn, : ) where ‘“personalised service” [was] the exception,
rather than the norm’ (Marston and McDonald : ). Considine et al.’s
comparative research showed a ‘marked increase in the level of routinisation
and standardisation at the frontline’ (: ) as agencies responded to the
intensification of administrative accountability by embracing standardisation
‘as a way to minimise risks’ (: ). This in turn led to a loss of differentia-
tion between for-profit and not-for-profit providers.
Since JN, there have been by two major re-structures of the Australian
system: Job Services Australia (JSA) (–) and Jobactive (–).
JSA was introduced by Labor in , following a review of JN. Major emphases
of the reform were to make the system less punitive and to replace JN’s ‘“one size
fits all” approach : : : with greater flexibility for employment services providers
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to tailor services’ (Gillard, ). Jobseekers were to become more involved in
designing their employment plans, with the new system placing a greater
emphasis on ‘increasing flexibility : : : and on providing more integrated and
holistic “wrap-around” support’ (SSC, : ). This was accompanied by a
partial softening of the compliance framework, as agencies were given more
discretion over the tailoring of clients’ Job Plans (Ramia and Carney, ).
The funding model was also adjusted to increase the incentives for agencies
to focus on assisting harder-to-help clients, and the performance framework
partially revised to move ‘away from the “command and control” relationship’
that had characterised the later years of JN (Finn, : ).
The restructure came at considerable transition cost. Approximately
, jobseekers were required to change provider, while agencies who
retained a similar market share incured millions in transaction costs associated
with the change (Finn, : ). This points ‘to a dilemma in the tendering
model’ (McDonald and Marston, : ). To maintain a competitive market,
the purchaser needs to continuously generate new tendering processes that, in
turn, generate high transaction costs associated with the preparation of tender-
ing documents, assessment of bids and negotiation of contacts. Whereas estab-
lished providers can deploy the informational advantages and surpluses gained
from previous contracts to bid for repeat contracts, new entrants ‘must expend
resources on market participation and business acquisition costs without any
guarantee that contracts can be secured’ (Bennett, : ). There are also
the ex-post transaction costs that arise for both the purchaser and providers
associated with monitoring the market to mitigate risks of gaming behaviours.
These transaction costs ‘are an inescapable by-product of contracting out’
(Bredgaard and Larsen, : ). However, institutional economists argue that
they are likely to be especially high in social services markets: where ‘a contractor
knows the quality of its service is difficult to observe, where a large degree of
information asymmetry exists : : : and where the assessment of a provider’s true
additionality is confounded by external factors such as the business cycle or
simply demand for labour’ (Hill, : ). To manage these risks, purchasers
try to steer agents’ behaviours via detailed contractual specification of processes,
penalty clauses, and mechanisms for post-contract oversight. But beside the
difficulties involved in fully specifying contracts and determining the appropriate
balance between price and quality in payment models (Bartlett, ; Bredgaard
and Larsen, ; Bennett, ), such a contracting regime is very costly to admin-
ister. By the end of JSA, the annual cost of administrating the system was estimated
at A$.m, or  per cent of total programme costs (ANAO, ).
The high-costs of administering the system, and associated impact on levels
of service flexibility, have been a persistent challenge for governments in Australia.
In mid-, the new Coalition government introduced what it argued was another
‘fundamental reform of employment services’ (DoE, : ). It criticised JSA as
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heavily ‘constrained by administrative requirements’ (DoE, : ), attributing this
to the system’s ‘limited scope for provider-initiated service design’ (DoE, : ).
Accordingly, and like preceeding reforms, a key objective of the reform was to
‘reduce service prescription’ (DoE, : ). Providers were permitted to bid on
the basis of different service models, in the hope that this would free them ‘to
deliver flexible solutions tailored to an individual jobseeker’s circumstances’
(ANAO, : ). At a more ideological level, the reform also sought to intensify
jobseeker activation through strengthening conditionality. Other key changes
included the lengthening of contracts to five years and increase in the size of
the geographic areas that agencies were awarded contracts for; changes that resem-
bled elements of the UK’s Work Programme commissioning model and which
were designed to minimise the purchaser’s transaction costs through reducing
the number of exchange relationships it would need to enter into and monitor
(Bennett, ). Another parallel with theWork Programme was the restructuring
of the pricing mechanism towards Payment-by-Results. The proportion of total
provider funding represented by outcome payments increased to more than 
per cent compared with a third previously (ANAO, : ).
These changes to how providers were contracted and paid by the purchaser
were designed to stimulate greater flexibility. However, by increasing the level of
financial risk that providers needed to assume to deliver contracts, they also
threatened to reduce diversity by making it harder for smaller, not-for-profit
organisations with fewer capital reserves to remain-in or enter the market.
Just  agencies won contracts. For-profit agencies won more of the maket than
before, prompting concerns about ‘the ongoing dilution of the not-for-profit dif-
ference in the system’ (Jobs Australia, a: ).
The study
While JSA and Jobactive diverged in their approaches to jobseeker compliance,
both reforms constituted attempts to reverse the standardised pattern of service
delivery that had developed under JN. This problem of standardisation related to
both the administrative, rule-bound approach to case management as well as the
loss of differentiation between providers. To consider whether these subsequent
reforms have produced substantial change towards a more varied and flexible
employment services market or exhibited patterns of institutional closure and
inertia, we return to Considine et al.’s () analysis of the impact of ten years
of reform on service flexibility at the Australian frontline. That study drew on
two waves of survey data collection with frontline staff, firstly between  and
, and repeated in , using largely the same instrument. This instrument
comprised over  questions, principally about: how frontline staff carry-out
basic service delivery tasks; the extent to which they use standardised assessment
tools and scripted IT-driven processes when working with clients; and the
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degree to which they incorporate client-preferences in servicing. That approach,
and ability to compare responses between workers in public, for-profit and not-for-
profit agencies, enabled a comparison between Australia’s partially contracted-
out system in the late s and fully privatised system by , with a dual
focus on whether increased marketisation had delivered more flexible services,
on the one hand, as well as greater diversity of assistance, on the other. We
update that analysis, using data from two further surveys in  and 
and benchmarking these against the  findings.
As in , these subsequent surveys were conducted online. In , more
than  frontline staff from  agencies were surveyed while  respondents
from  agencies participated in  (Table ). The data were analysed using
SPSS software. Chi-squared and Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to detect differ-
ences between survey years when responses were categorical, ordinal or rank
order. In cases of numeric responses or continuous variables, ANOVA was used.
Findings from  have previously been reported, suggesting large conti-
nuities in frontline practice between JN and JSA (Considine et al., a). With
an additional wave of data collection tracking frontline practice under Jobactive,
a longer-term assessment of patterns of continuity and change in the degree of
‘flexibility’ within the Australian quasi-market is now possible. We assess this
from multiple perspectives: the level of frontline decision-making (discretion),
the level of responsiveness to individual jobseekers (tailoring), and the degree of
difference between providers (market diversity). These dimensions are interre-
lated insofar as a system that encourages tailoring requires that frontline staff
have some capacity to act independently and to adjust their approach to the
individual. It doesn’t automatically follow that frontline autonomy will promote
tailoring, since discretion can also be exercised to make work more manageable
and in ways that benefit ‘the worker rather than the client’ (Fletcher, : ).
Nonetheless, a degree of autonomy is a precondition for the possibility of ‘con-
textualised’ (Sainsbury, : ) decision-making that is responsive to the
interests of clients. Accordingly, a ‘flexible’ quasi-market implies high levels
of professional discretion, directed toward service tailoring which, in turn,
should produce greater variation between providers.
Relying on frontline workers’ self-reported understandings of their working
conditions as indicators of actual levels of flexibility within the Australian
TABLE . Respondents
For-profit staff Not-for-profit staff Other/unknown Total
    
    
    
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welfare market is not without problems. There is a risk that the data could be
subject to recall bias or skewed by respondents’ overly optimistic assessment of
their own agency as workers. Nevertheless, we expect any such effects to be gen-
eralised across the sample, both within and between survey years, and therefore
unlikely to undermine the value of the comparative analysis over time.
Findings
Table  reports several measures used to track changes in frontline discretion
over time. In contrast to the intent behind the JSA and Jobactive reforms, these
data suggest a moderate reduction in levels of frontline autonomy since JN.
TABLE . Flexibility and discretion
Strongly
Agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Mean
rank
When it comes to day-to-day work I am free to decide for myself what I will do with each client/
job seeker
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
My supervisor knows a lot about the work I do day-to-day
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
When I come across something not covered by the procedural guide I refer it to my supervisor
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
Our computer system tells me what steps to take with clients/job seekers and when to take them
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared ()= .; P= .
Note: Significance tests have been conducted on mean rank scores, which also show the
direction of change.
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Frontline staff remain under high supervisory oversight, and there is evidence of
increased reliance on IT systems and standardised protocols to guide their deci-
sion-making. This is reflected in the decline in the proportion of participants
who agree or strongly agree that they are free to decide for themselves what
to do with clients. This has fallen from just under  per cent in  to below
 per cent in . This change is statistically significant and is mirrored in
participants’ responses concerning the extent to which their decision-making is
mediated by computers. In ,  per cent of respondents indicated that their
computer system told them what steps to take with jobseekers and when to take
them. Despite the considerable criticisms directed at the transformation of case
management into a form of ‘screen-level bureaucracy’ under JN (Marston and
McDonald, ), this proportion increased to above  per cent following the
JSA reforms. This change is statistically significant. Although there has been a
marginal decline in the proportion reporting such a reliance on computer-based
decisions since, this latter decrease is not statistically significant. The data also
show no statistically significant easing in the level of supervisory oversight of
frontline staff by agency managers. Between surveys, there have been few
significant changes in participants’ responses concerning either the extent to
which their supervisor knows a lot about the work they do from day-to-day,
or their tendency to defer decisions to their supervisor in cases not covered
by procedural guidelines. Although the proportions agreeing or strongly agree-
ing that (a) they defer to their supervisors when faced with issues not covered by
the procedural guide, or that (b) their supervisor knows a lot about their daily
work, have declined from  per cent and  per cent respectively in  to
 per cent and  per cent respectively in , these changes are not statisti-
cally significant. This indicates the continuation of a procedural approach to
decision-making based on following scripts and escalating more complex cases
to line managers (Considine and Lewis, ).
This pattern is also observed in the data in Table , which track a range of
measures concerning whether client servicing is driven by standardised routines
or is responsive to individual choice. Again, we find no evidence of a discernible
reversal in the pattern of routinised frontline work observable under JN. Indeed,
the proportion who report that the IT system they use dictates how they do their
jobs ‘to a large extent’, and that their own judgement is ‘not at all’ influential in
determining what activities are recommended, have both increased since .
It must be noted, however, that these changes involve relatively marginal
increases, and are not statistically significant. What is statistically significant
is the increase in the proportion who indicate that the decisions they make about
clients are determined ‘to a great deal’ by standard programme rules, which has
steadily risen from  per cent in  to  per cent in  to  per cent in
. Although there has been a somewhat surprising decrease in the proportion
indicating that answers to standardised assessment questions are influential in
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TABLE . Flexibility and tailoring
.A small
extent     
.A large
extent
Mean
Rank
The extent to which you feel the IT system you use dictates how you do your job?
 (n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
 (n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
 () .% .%) .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
.Very little /
None     
.A great
deal
Mean
Rank
To what extent are the decisions you make about your clients determined by standard
programme rules and regulations?
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
Howmuch does your agency emphasise giving clients more CHOICE about the services they receive?
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
Strongly
Agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Mean
Rank
All my clients receive a similar service
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
Not at all
influential
Somewhat
influential
Quite
influential
Very
influential
Mean
rank
How influential are: : : : answers to a standard set of assessment questions in determining what
activities are recommended for each job seeker?
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
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determining the decisions they make about jobseekers. This suggests that stand-
ardisation has primarily manifested in the adoption of a more rule-bound
approach to decision-making rather than via decisions being aided by the uti-
lisation of systematic assessments of client needs.
On the question of tailoring, the data are more ambiguous. On one inter-
pretation, tailoring implies that clients receive dissimilar menus of services
according to their circumstances (Considine et al., ). Although differentia-
tion could also be construed as inequitable treatment and evidence of jobseeker
creaming and parking (Sainsbury, ). In , almost  per cent of partic-
ipants reported that all their clients received a similar service and our data show
no significant pattern of change since. However, there is some evidence that
client choice is becoming marginally more influential in determining what
services jobseekers receive; or more accurately, what activities they undertake.
In ,  per cent of respondents indicated that the agency they worked
for placed ‘a great deal’ of emphasis on client choice compared with  per cent
in . However, this change was not statistically significant and was offset by a
similar increase in the proportion who said that their agency placed no emphasis
whatsoever on user-choice. At the individual level, staff did indicate that
jobseekers’ preferences were becoming more influential in determining what
activities they recommended, with the proportion indicating that jobseeker
preferences are ‘very influential’ in this regard increasing from just  per cent
in  to  per cent in subsequent surveys.
TABLE . Continued
Not at all
influential
Somewhat
influential
Quite
influential
Very
influential
Mean
rank
: : : your own judgement in determining what activities are recommended?
(n= ) . . . . .
(n= ) . . . . .
(n= ) . . . . .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
: : : jobseekers’ preferences in determining what activities are recommended?
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .
(n= ) .% .% .% .% .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P< .
–: Chi-squared()= .; P= .
–: Chi-squared()=.; P< .
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Overall, what emerges is a picture in which frontline workers’ own profes-
sional discretion has narrowed while, simultaneously, jobseekers’ preferences
have paradoxically gained in influence. This may suggest that the application
of programme rules has become a more focal task of frontline work and is con-
sistent with the ideological elements of the Jobactive reforms on ‘introducing
stronger mutual obligation requirements’ (DoE, : ). But within this process
of ensuring that jobseekers are meeting requirements, clients are being given
some choice over how to comply (or which programmed activities to undertake).
This might be characterised as a form of shallow tailoring: client choice influ-
ences what activities are undertaken but the menu jobseekers can select from,
and the time when activities must be undertaken, is bounded by programme
rules (compare Sainsbury, : ).
What is perhaps most remarkable about these data on frontline discretion
and tailoring is the absence of significant patterns of change in the levels of flex-
ibility since JN. To consider this issue in more detail, we further analysed the
data using an inter-sectorial comparative approach. Consistent with previous
data analysis methods used to consider levels of convergence within the sector,
we compared the responses of staff employed by for-profit and not-for-profit
providers on  different variables (Table ). Already, in , our data had
suggested isomorphic pressures in the Australian quasi-market insofar as the
JN experiment did not lead to an industry of service innovators but a ‘herd’
of profit maximisers : : :who embrace standardisation of services as a way to
minimise risks’ (Considine et al., : ). However, repeating this test on
the  items used across all waves of data collection since  shows a
dramatic intensification in the level of organisational convergence since JN.
Whereas  statistically significant differences were observed between the
for-profit and not-for-profit sectors in , this reduced to  under JSA and
 under Jobactive. That is, on almost  per cent of items, we found no statis-
tically significant difference between the responses of for-profit and not-for-
profit agency staff. Of the differences that remained, several related to workers’
level of contact with external agencies and stakeholders. But on items related to
agencies’ use of sanctions, time spent on various job tasks (e.g. documenting
compliance, in contact with jobseekers), and level of frontline discretion, the
number of statistically significant differences between the responses of for-profit
and not-for-profit agency staff substantially reduced post-JN.
By , any lingering differences between for-profit and not-for-profit
agency workers in terms of their perceptions of jobseekers and willingness to
apply a standardised ‘work first’ model of activation had entirely disappeared.
Similarly, the value-orientations of for-profit and not-for-profit staff, and their
beliefs about the key objectives of their jobs, had become almost indistinguish-
able. Whereas the responses of frontline staff working in different sectors
significantly differed along five variables related to their goal orientation and
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TABLE . Statistically significant differences in response between
respondents from for-profit and not-for-profit agencies
  
Caseload and time spent on tasks
Caseload size X
Number of jobseekers seen per day X X
Proportion of clients followed ‘somewhat’ X
Time spent in direct contact with jobseekers X
: : :working with employers X X
: : : on contract compliance X
Working with other organisations
Level of contact with another office in this organisation X
: : :with officials from a government department X
: : :with employers X
: : :with schools and universities X X
Willingness to assist employees from other organisations X X
Sanctioning
Reasons for sanctioning: when a jobseeker fails to contact our office X
Reasons for not sanctioning: The jobseeker is normally a good client : : : X
Whether agencies encourage staff to be lenient in the use of sanctions X X
No. of jobseekers sanctioned in previous two weeks X X
Work-first orientation
Agency goal: to help jobseekers get a job quickly OR raise education levels X
Management advice: whether clients should take low-paying, entry jobs
or wait for better opportunities
X
Frontline autonomy
Decisions are determined by standard programme rules and regulations X
Supervisor knows a lot about the work they day each day X
Use of personal judgement to decide what to do X X
Priorities and goal orientation
Job objective: maximise financial outcomes X
Job objective: maximise number of clients off benefits X
Consider themselves an advocate for clients X
Awareness that organisation pays attention to the income they generate X
Office work priorities X
Personal work priorities X
Perceptions of jobseekers
Whether jobseekers are on benefits due to lack of effort X
% of jobseekers who would rather be on benefits than work X
Believe that many clients will never find open employment X
Governments should do more to help jobseekers X
Organisational commitment
Willingness to exert extra effort on behalf of organisation X
Satisfaction with pay and conditions X
Miscellaneous
Feel informed about policies and procedures X
Feel informed about how well their job is done X
Views about system effectiveness in moving people off benefits X
Influence of availability of labour market programme vacancies on
what activities are recommend
X
Total   
Note: Only items where significant differences were found are shown. X denotes a statistically
significant difference.
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work priorities in , this narrowed to just one remaining difference by .
This, along with the homogenisation in frontline workers’ beliefs about
jobseekers, points to strong consolidation in the Australian system over the past
decade. This consolidation is particularly striking insofar as the ‘core’ of
organisational cultures and value systems is thought to be less susceptible to
influences from the institutional environment than the ‘periphery’ of organisa-
tional processes (Ashworth et al., : ).
Discussion and Conclusion
We have assessed whether the Australian quasi-market has evolved into a more
flexible system across three dimensions: frontline discretion, tailoring, and mar-
ket diversity. We find no significant pattern of change between JN, JSA, and
Jobactive in levels of standardisation or supervisory oversight at the frontline
and, if anything, further erosion of frontline discretion and the intensification
of prescriptive approaches to decision-making. This is despite repeated govern-
ments explicitly stating that one of their key reform priorities was increasing
service diversity and enabling better-tailored services. The diffusion of case
management practices and value-orientations across organisations has also
rapidly accelerated, with the surviving for-profit and not-for-profit providers
much more alike than under JN. What is notable about this consolidation is
its direction, with providers converging on a standardised model of frontline
practice rather than the enhanced flexibility anticipated by the reforms. This
consolidation might be described as a form of non-compliant convergence
(Ashworth et al., ) insofar as providers have resisted conforming to norms
of flexibility promoted by the purchaser.
What are the mechanisms driving this heavy consolidation within the
Australian employment services field? Our data do not allow us to establish
these conclusively since we only track reported changes in frontline practice
and organisation models over many years of complex institutional changes,
not the causal mechanisms propelling these changes. Moreover, we cannot
discount the role of activation policy reforms, such as the strengthening of
mandatory job search and other conditionality (e.g. Work-for-the-Dole)
requirements under later iterations of the system in ‘crowding out’ possibilities
for service flexibility through limiting opportunities for providers to deviate
from implementing standardised ‘work first’ models. That is, the increasing
standardisation of the Australian employment services field may have been
driven, at least in part, ‘from the top down’ through policy effects on frontline
practice and reduced possibilities for referring clients to alternative employability
programmes and flanking social services (see, in relation to similar patterns in the
UK, Fuertes and Lindsay, : ).
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Nevertheless, several additional factors may plausibly have contributed to the
deepening institutional inertia in additional to these policy dynamics. Some of these
relate to the mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures that take hold within
organisational fields over time, such that ‘the more mature an organisational field,
the more likely it is to be heavily “structurated” by institutional norms and rules’
(Ashworth et al., : ). As institutional theorists observe, information flows
and interactions between organisations increase as organisational fields become
more developed, along with socialisation processes via the establishment of profes-
sional communities (DiMaggio and Powell, : ). Employee transfer may also
become more prevalent, further perpetuating ‘adherence to legitimised organisa-
tional forms’ (Kitchener, : ). Here previously reported survey data show
an upward trend in the proportion of staff with over  years’ experience working
in the field, from  per cent in  (Considine et al., ) to  per cent in 
(Lewis et al., ). Yet the proportion who have been with their employer for over
 years has only marginally increased, from  to  per cent.
Other explanatory factors are more specific to the modes (and terms)
of transaction within the Australian welfare market, and how these have been
continuously adjusted by the purchaser to deal with some of the implementation
challenges that arise when trying to achieve public policy objectives via the NPM
instruments of competitive tendering and contract regulation. As Breedgaard
and Larsen argue, striking the right balance ‘between the logic of the market
and social goals’ remains a constant challenge for governments when contracting
social services from market providers (: ). Authorities try ‘to let the mar-
ket work on its own premises’ to enhance efficiency but information
asymmetry problems and the high dergee of uncertainty over the relationship
between inputs and outputs makes the risks of gaming behaviours and other unin-
tended consequences especially high. As we have seen in Australia, ‘constant
adjustments and changes to the tendering system’ (Bredgaard and Larsen,
: ) are needed to cope with the inherent tensions between equity and effi-
ciency in welfare markets. Reviewing these reform dynamics, we can see how fea-
tures of the structuring of quasi-market transactions by the public purchaser
intersect with other isomorphic pressures to amplify tendencies towards inertia
within the Australian welfare market.
The first of these is the displacement of ‘black box’ approaches with
forms of ‘hard contracting’ (van Berkel, : ) underpinned by stronger
forms of administrative accountability. These include the specification of
detailed procedural guidelines by the purchaser, regular caseload and compli-
ance audits, and the introduction of mandatory IT-based case management
systems. Under JSA, for example, more than , pages of departmental guide-
lines applied to providers (ANAO, ) who faced the threat of payment
recovery penalties, the imposition of additional reporting requirements, and
potential exclusion from future business if they were found to be in breach
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of contractual clauses or guidelines. While the Jobactive contract gave
providers more leeway to develop their own models, these had to cohere with
prescribed universal service guarantees. Additionally, frontline work continued to
be guided by over  different guideline documents covering issues such as the
circumstances under which jobseekers may be suspended, what activities to
include in Job Plans, and allowable employment fund expenditure (ANAO,
). These guidelines and formalised service guarantees powerfully signal the
institutional legitimacy of various organisational practices, while the intensive
monitoring of providers for breaches of contractual compliance exerts coercive
isomorphic pressures on organisations to follow prescribed processes.
The reluctance of the purchaser to abandon this micro-management of
providers is understandable given the political risks associated with contract
gaming. But, in addition to increasing the transaction costs of managing
the market, the evidence suggests that it locks-in ‘a focus on transactions’
(Jobs Australia, : ) and narrow approach to client-servicing based
around reducing providers’ exposure to audit risk. This was illustrated by
Senate Inquiry testimony about a reluctance across the sector to spend
Employment Fund resources on anything beyond a narrow range of items,
which agency managers attributed to consultants’ fear of putting themselves
and their organisation ‘at risk of recovery funds and compliance action’
(SEERC, : ).
Elements of the performance framework applied by the purchaser further
reinforce this risk-aversion among providers; most notably, the Star Ratings
system which is used to periodically re-allocate market share, in terms of the
proportion of jobseekers within a contract area, from low to high-performing
providers. With providers’ short-term survival dependent on achieving -stars
or above, the incentive is ‘to focus on quantum rather than quality of outcomes’
(NESA, : ) and to compete ‘to out-do each other’ (Jobs Australia, :
) at delivering the same services rather than experimenting with innovations
that may put them ‘at risk in the next business allocation’ (Jobs Australia, b:
). This short-term orientation is further reinforced by the pricing signals in the
payment model, which have been reconfigured towards Payment-by-Results.
This has shifted more financial risk onto providers, whose viability has become
increasingly dependent on maximising the number of employment outcomes
they can achieve at minimal cost. In other jurisdictions, providers have
responded to these downward cost pressures by increasing caseload sizes and
employing ‘fewer and less qualified staff’ (Greer et al., : ). But increasing
the outcomes incentives in the payment model also risks further contributing to
standardisation through the exclusion of smaller, not-for-profits, with fewer
capital resources. This stems from how results-based payment models require
agencies to finance the establishment of human and capital infrastructure on
the basis of estimated, but uncertain, outcome payments. When the payment
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model incorporates only limited administration fees, as under Jobactive, the
available fixed funding may be ‘insufficient to cover the administrative cost
of managing the Deed’ (NESA, : ) or the capital investment required
to establish service infrastructure. It is a problem that is compounded by the
trend towards larger, longer contracts negotiated with fewer agencies given
how these increase the size of the geographic areas across which agencies must
deliver services.
As these examples show, how transactions are configured by the purchaser
in terms of the pricing signals in payment models, the size of the contract areas,
and the level of administrative requirements written into contract deeds, can
reinforce broader isomorphic pressures within employment services fields
through, among other things: increasing entry barriers, intensifying providers’
risk-aversion, and incentivising a focus on low-cost service delivery models.
These organisational field and transaction dynamics intersect to make quasi-
markets in employment services vulnerable to consolidation around a group
of ‘insider firms’ (Bennett, : ). Whether Australia has reached such a
tipping point is unclear, although the degree of organisational convergence since
JN suggests it may not be far off. The degree to which the Australian experience
can be generalised to other countries also requires further work. It may be that
some of the influences driving institutional inertia in the Australian market can
be mitigated through alternative organisations of the transactions in welfare
markets, such as replacing the monopsony purchasing of competitive tendering
with direct purchasing of services by voucher-holding clients.
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